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SUMMARY
 
Many proposals for expanding health coverage involve the creation of organizations to produce 
information on comparative effectiveness, make coverage decisions, manage the marketplace for 
health insurance, or offer a public health insurance plan.  These new organizations might take the 
form of a federal executive branch agency, an independent commission, government corporation, 
legislative branch agency, or public-private entity.  Some proposals would create entities with 
substantial independence from the usual political processes, such as the Federal Reserve enjoys. 
 
The choice of an appropriate organizational structure to carry out a public function raises several 
issues: the source and predictability of the entity’s funding, its operational flexibilities, its degree 
of political independence and accountability, and the structure of its management.  These matters 
are not fully determined by an agency’s organizational form, however, and targeted solutions are 
often available and usually preferable.  For example, the Congress may provide an agency with a 
permanent appropriation or exemption from certain legal or regulatory constraints without 
removing it from an executive department. 
 
Organizations that use governmental powers and funds and make public policy need to be 
accountable as well as effective.  A quasi-governmental or Federal Reserve-like entity might be 
suitable for producing advisory information on the comparative effectiveness of medical 
treatments but not for making decisions that directly affect the health coverage of individual 
Americans. 
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Any plan for expanding health coverage and containing the growth of health costs will 
necessarily create additional tasks for government, which may be assigned to existing or new 
governmental entities.  Prompted by concerns over perceived political gridlock, the role of 
special interests, and inadequate or uncertain funding, several recent proposals would create new 
health-related entities or agencies with substantial independence from the usual political 
processes.  Sometimes these proposed entities are described as a “Federal Reserve for health.” 
 
This paper briefly describes proposals to create new entities or agencies as part of a reformed 
health coverage system, catalogs the major types of federal executive agencies and non-
governmental entities, and considers some of the issues involved in choosing an appropriate 
organizational design.  The appendix to the paper provides more detailed information about some 
specific proposals in the authors’ own words. 
 
PROPOSALS FOR NEW HEALTH-RELATED ORGANIZATIONS
 
Proposals for new independent, health-related agencies fall into four categories: 
 
• an entity to conduct research on the comparative effectiveness of health care services, 
• a commission or other entity to determine which health care items and services public 
and private insurers should cover, 
• an agency to manage the marketplace where health insurance is sold, and 
• an agency to offer health insurance services. 
 
Under some proposals, a single entity would combine two or more of these functions.  As the 
Congressional Budget Office has written, “The appropriate organizational form for any new or 
expanded federal entity, along with the mechanism and level of funding, may depend in large 
art on what activities it would carry out” (CBO 2007). p
 
roducing Information on Comparative Effectiveness P
 
In health care, comparative effectiveness analysis is a “rigorous evaluation of the impact of 
different options that are available for treating a given medical condition for a particular set of 
patients.  Such a study may compare similar treatments, such as competing drugs, or it may 
analyze very different approaches, such as surgery and drug therapy.  The analysis may focus 
only on the relative medical benefits and risks of each option, or it may also weigh both the costs 
nd benefits of those options” (CBO 2007). a
 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is one category of comparative effectiveness analysis.  In cost-
effectiveness analysis, the resources used in supporting an intervention are measured in monetary 
terms, but health outcomes or consequences are measured in their natural units, such as number 
of lives saved, cases diagnosed, cases prevented, or increases in life expectancy or quality-
adjusted life years.  The strength of cost-effectiveness analysis is that no dollar value is placed on 
health outcomes or human lives, as in cost-benefit analysis, where both costs and benefits are 
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expressed in monetary terms.  However, in cost-effectiveness analysis only interventions whose 
outcomes are measured in equivalent terms can be compared. 
Comparative effectiveness analysis is increasingly advocated as a way of slowing the growth
health costs without incurring adverse health outcomes.  A prominent proponent is Peter R. 
Orszag, since January 2007 the director of the Congressional Budget Office.  “The financial 
incentives for both providers and patients tend to encourage the adoption of more expensive 
treatments and procedures, even if evidence of their relative effectiveness is limited,” Orszag 
writes.  “The expansion of research on comparative effectiveness could help to correct these 
roblems, especially the addition of analyses that both examp
risks of each treatment option (for all patients or some subgroup thereof) and weight the benefits
against the costs” (Orszag and Ellis 2007). 
 
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has offered one of the most detaile
and carefully analyzed proposals for producing information on comparative effectiveness.   In 
June 2007 report, MedPAC finds that the private sector cannot be expected to produce 
systematic, objective comparative-effectiveness information, and there is no comprehensive 
deral effort to fill the gap.  It therefore recommends the creation of an independent entity to fe
examine the comparative effectiveness of alternative ways of diagnosing and treating health 
conditions, including drugs, medical devices, surgical procedures, and medical services. 
 
The entity proposed by MedPAC would set research priorities, review existing evidence on 
comparative effectiveness, conduct or sponsor new studies, ensure that its findings are unbiased 
and not affected by the interests of researchers or funders, operate under a transparent process, 
obtain input from stakeholders, reexamine the effectiveness of services as new information and 
treatments become available, and disseminate its findings widely.  Its primary mission would be 
“to sponsor studies that compare the clinical effectiveness of a service with its alternatives,” but 
MedPAC “does not rule out” studies of cost effectiveness as well.  MedPAC “envisions that the 
entity would contract out most of the research to outside groups, including existing governmenta
agencies, with experience conducting comparative-effectiveness studies,” although the entity 
ould need experienced in-house staff to design proposals and mw
makes clear that the entity “would have no role in making or recommending either coverage or 
payment decisions for public or private plans” (MedPAC 2007). 
 
The MedPAC report cites similar previous proposals by AcademyHealth, Joel Kupersmith and 
colleagues, Uwe Reinhardt, and Gail Wilensky (MedPAC 2007).  As part of comprehensive 
plans to achieve universal health coverage, Ezekiel Emanuel and Victor Fuchs have proposed an
Institute for Technology and Outcomes Assessment (Emanuel and Fuchs 2006, 2007), the 
ommittee for Economic Development (CED) has prC
and Technology Assessment (CED 2007), and Len Nichols has proposed a Compara
Effectiveness Agency (Nichols 2007). 
 
Some of these proposals would give the new entity a high degree of organizational 
independence.  The institute proposed by the CED would, “like the Federal Reserve Board,” be 
“freestanding and semi-autonomous.”  It would have a “stable budget,” independent of the 
annual appropriation process, “to provide thorough insulation from short-term political 
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ial 
require an administrative agency to determine whether specific procedures or technologies 
pressures” (CED 2007).  Such proposals are prompted in part by unhappy experience with prio
efforts at technology assessment by government agencies.  The Office of Technology 
Assessment, a Congressional agency, was abolished in 1995, and the Agency for Health Care 
Policy and Research (now the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality [AHRQ]) faced a 
near-death experience in the same year after back surgeons objected to the agency’s guideline
for back surgery (Lewis 1995; IOM 2008).  P
D
ethnic disparities in health care (Pear 2004). 
 
So far, MedPAC has made no recommendation on how to structure or finance the propos
entity that would produce comparative-effectiveness information.  Citing Wilensky, the 
commission suggests that the entity should be able to produce research that is viewed as 
objective and free of bias and conflict of interest, be independent of stakeholders and political 
pressures, and have stable financing and staffing.  The commission’s report considers some of 
the pros and cons of making the entity a
a
a congressionally chartered nonprofit). 
 
The Children’s Health and Medicare Protection Act of 2007, passed by the House of 
Representatives in August 2007, would establish a Center for Comparative Effectiveness 
Research within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (section 904 of H.R. 3162).  It 
would also establish an independent Comparative Effectiveness Research Commission to 
oversee, evaluate, and set priorities for the center’s work.  The commission would be comprised 
of two designated officials of the executive branch and 15 additional members appointed by the 
Comptroller General for 4-year terms.  The center and the commission would be supported
p
be financed by fees on insured and self-insured health plans and transfers from Medicare. 
 
A January 2008 report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) recommends that the Congress 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish “a single national clinical effectiven
assessment program . . . with the authority and resources to set priorities for and sponsor 
systematic reviews of clinical effectiveness, and to develop methodologic[al] and reporting 
standards for conducting systematic reviews and developing clinical guidelines. The I
also recommends that the Secretary “appoint a broadly representative Clinical Effectiveness 
Advisory Board to oversee the Program.” 
o
public-private collaboration (IO
 
Making Coverage Decisions 
 
Any government program to require or provide health insurance coverage requires determining
the extent and nature of that coverage.  While the law creating the program would most like
specify the scope of coverage to some degree (for example, by category of service or actuar
value), the continual development of new medical services, drugs, and devices will always 
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ould be appointed by “someone reasonably apolitical” and serve for long terms (Jost 2007). 
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should be covered.  In the Medicare program, for example, coverage decisions are made by the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and its contractors, not only for tra
M
 
Studies of coverage determinations typically find that proponents of new technologies are the 
most active participants in the process.  In a recent international comparative study, for example,
Timothy Jost concludes that “economic and political pressure in most instances favors adoption 
of technology coverage, and that
fr
 
To reduce the influence of health care providers, drug companies, device manufacturers, 
disease organizations, and other interested parties, some analysts have suggested that an 
independent entity should be created that would not only conduct comparative-effectiveness 
analyses but also make decisions about which items and services should be covered by public 
and private health insurance.   Leif Haase has proposed the creation of an agency “to review the 
cost-effectiveness of medical procedures, therapies, and drugs” and to “fix the basis for coverage 
decisions for different plan benefit levels” (Haase 2005).  Jost has proposed creation of a feder
commission to determine which items and services insurers would cover.  Jost makes explicit 
that his proposed commission would not only initiate and review assessments of comparative 
effectiveness but would also engage in policymaking—for example, weighing costs and benefits
of medical services and determining which items or services might prove particularly amenable 
to being used for risk selection.  To shield the commission from political pressure, its members
w
 
In Len Nichols’ plan for universal coverage, a Benefits Board would establish a mandated 
benefits package, which would be the legally required minimum amount of health insurance 
coverage.   The Benefits Board would also establish a structure of cost-sharing, including cost-
sharing subsidies for low-income individuals.  The board would be “an independent entity” but 
“would be expected to work closely with Congress, more or less like the Federal Reserve 
chairman does” (Nichols 2007).  Although Nichols suggests that Comptroller General of th
United States appoint the members of the Benefits Board, this arrangement might well be 
unconstitutional, since the Supreme Court held in Bowsher v. Synar (1986) that the Comptroller 
General may not perform an executive function (in that case, sequestration of spending aut
under the Balanced Budget Act) 
re
 
M
 
Many proposals for expanding health coverage include a national system of health insurance 
exchanges, which would serve as a central marketplace in which much or all health insurance 
would be bought and sold.  Although these plans differ in their details, the proposed exchanges
would perform such functions as establishing a basic benefits package (if not determined by a 
separate benefits board or commission), creating and managing a market for health insurance, 
assuring that health insurance plans meet standards of financial soundness and customer service,
providing educational material to potential applicants, enrolling people in plans individually or 
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would relinquish some of their health policy decisions to it (Daschle 2008). 
n 
table 
y 
ve 
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as members of a group, maintaining enrollment information as individual circumstances change, 
collecting individual premiums and government subsidies (if any), and distributing payments to 
plans on a risk-adjusted basis.  For a more extensive discussion of insurance ex
b
 
Nichols suggests that an insurance purchasing exchange could be managed either by a 
government agency, like the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), or by a 
nonprofit organization, like the Pacific Business Group on Health, which administers healt
insurance for large employers in California.  Exchanges could be organized along stat
regional lines (Nichols 2007).  Emanuel and Fuchs and the Committee for Economic 
Development both model their proposed administrative structure—a central board with a 
network of regional exchanges—on the Federal Reserve System (Emanuel and Fuchs 2007; CED
2007).  In the CED proposal, the governors of the “Health Fed” would be appointed for 14-year 
terms, and the heads of the regional exchanges would be selected by the board of governors.
Health Fed would be funded by fees, such as a levy on health insurance premiums, and not 
subject to annual appropriations.  According to its authors, this model is designed to “conv
impartiality, expertise, free
p
 
Former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle has recently become an advocate of a Federal 
Reserve-like health board.  In a book published in February 2008, Daschle argues that the failure 
to achieve universal coverage and contain health costs “is rooted in the complexity of the health-
care issue, the limitations of our politic
d
I believe that the only way to solve the health-care crisis is to change the way that we 
approach the challenge.  In this book, I propose a Federal Health Board, modeled lo
on the Federal Reserve System, to do so.  It would create a public framework for a
largely private health-care delivery system.  Its main job would be to develop the 
standards and structure for a health system that ensures accessible, affordable, and high-
quality care. . . . Like the Federal Reserve, the Federal Health Board would be compose
of highly independent experts, insulated from politics.  Congress and the Wh
 
The notion of a Federal Reserve-like board to manage a health insurance exchange appears to 
have originated in the early 1990s in the work of the Jackson Hole Group, an informal collectio
of health policy experts.  In its original proposal in 1992, the group proposed a “new National 
Health Board as an independent agency, like the SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission].”  
In this way, it wrote, “The NHB will be free from day-to-day interference while still accoun
to elected political officials.”   The group rejected “an autonomous Federal Reserve Board 
model,” which “would have too little public accountability given the scale and public sensitivit
of health care reforms” (Ellwood, Enthoven, and Etheredge 1992).  Soon thereafter, however, 
one of the leaders of the group described the proposed board differently: “The board would ha
a status similar to the Federal 
(E
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e public program. 
YPES OF FEDERAL AGENCIES AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE ENTITIES
 
In 1999, Senator John Breaux and Representative Bill Thomas proposed an independent board to
manage the Medicare program.  Their proposal apparently stemmed from two sources: a desir
to remove Congress from many of the details of administering Medicare, and a belief that an 
inherent conflict exists in having a single agency administer a government-run fee-for-service 
plan and a system of private insurance plans (King et al. 2002).  Breaux and Thomas propos
that the role of the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA, now CMS) be limited to 
operating Medicare’s fee-for-service program and that both the fee-for-service program and 
private plans be regulated by an independent Medicare Board.  They cited the Federal Re
Board and the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board
B
 
O
 
In addition to serving as a clearinghouse for private insurance plans, a new agency might also 
offer a competing public health insurance plan.  In Jacob Hacker’s proposal, for example, “eve
legal resident of the United States who lacks access to Medicare or good workplace coverag
would be able to buy into the ‘Health Care for America Plan,’ a new public insurance pool 
modeled after Medicare.”  Like Medicare, this plan would offer parti
fe
 
Hacker’s proposal appears to combine the operation of the public insurance plan and supervisi
of the private plans in one administrative agency, as is now the case with Medicare, but these 
two functions could potentially be separated, as in the Breaux-Thomas proposal.  In the Daschl
proposal, the Federal Health Board “would work with Medicare to develop a public insurance 
option for the [national purchasing] pool, designing it to compete with private insurance plans o
the FEHBP menu” (D
th
 
T
 
What types of organizational entities would best be tasked with carrying out the health-re
functions just identified?  “In organizational design,” says Stanton, “the key is to fit the 
appropriate organizational form to the purposes to be achieved. . . . Once policy makers have 
identified the intended goals and purposes of an agency, they can look to existing organizations 
for possible models that they might adapt” (Stanton 2002).  We therefore turn to identifying
menu of organizational options and the issues
lated 
 the 
 that arise in choosing among them.  Table 1 
rovides a quick summary of the discussion. 
variety, and the following taxonomy lists only the types that are relevant in the present context.
p
 
For the most part, the federal government carries out its activities through agencies in the 
executive branch, of which the President of the United States is chief executive.  However, the 
federal government has also created a many public-private and private entities to help achieve 
public purposes.  Governmental and quasi-governmental organizations exist in almost infinite 
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Table 1.  Types of Federal Agencies and Public-Private Entities and Their Characteristics 
 
Type of Organization Funding Authority Operational Flexibilities Political Independence and 
Accountability 
Management Structure 
Executive Departments Annual appropriations; 
occasionally, permanent 
appropriations 
Subject to general laws affecting 
personnel, contracting, disclosure, and 
due process; flexibility sometimes 
provided 
Subject to presidential direction and 
control; agency head serves at the 
pleasure of the President  
Headed by cabinet 
secretary 
Independent Regulatory 
Commissions 
Annual appropriations Subject to general laws affecting 
personnel, contracting, disclosure, and 
due process 
Regulations not subject to executive 
review; members appointed for staggered 
5- to 7-year terms; some political balance 
required 
Multi-member boards 
Government 
Corporations 
Income from business-type 
transactions; appropriations 
generally not required 
Perform business-like functions; exempt 
from some or many legal limitations that 
apply to agencies funded by annual 
appropriations 
May be independent entity with 
appointed board or part of an executive 
department  
Executive appointed by 
the board manages 
operations 
Other Independent 
Executive Agencies 
Annual appropriations; 
occasionally, permanent 
appropriations 
Subject to general laws affecting 
personnel, contracting, disclosure, and 
due process 
Varies  Varies
Federal Reserve System Income from U.S. securities 
acquired through open-market 
operations; charges for services 
Exempt from many federal procedural 
requirements  
Independent central bank; governors 
appointed for 14-year terms; chair 
appointed for 4-year term 
7-member Board of 
Governors; 12 regional 
Federal Reserve Banks 
Legislative Branch 
Agencies 
Annual appropriations Subject to most general laws affecting 
personnel, contracting, disclosure, and 
due process 
Responsible to the Congress; serve in 
advisory capacity 
Varies; may not carry out 
executive functions 
Federally Funded 
Research and 
Development Centers 
From the budget of the 
sponsoring agency and private 
sources 
Generally exempt from federal 
procedural requirements 
Under guidance and oversight of 
sponsoring federal agency 
Managed by non-
governmental 
organizations 
Agency-Related 
Nonprofits 
From private sources Generally exempt from federal 
procedural requirements 
Legal relationship with a federal 
department or agency 
Varies 
Congressionally 
Chartered Organizations 
From specific appropriations 
and private sources 
Generally exempt from federal 
procedural requirements 
Non-governmental  Varies
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Federal Executive Agencies 
 
The United States Government Manual, the self-described official handbook of the U.S. federal 
government identifies only two types of executive agencies—(1) departments and (2) 
independent establishments and government corporations (Federal Register 2007).  A more 
refined taxonomy might distinguish independent regulatory commissions, government 
corporations, and other types of independent agencies, although the distinctions between these 
remaining categories are often blurred (Warren 1998). 
 
Executive Departments 
 
The 15 cabinet departments (State, Treasury, Defense, and so on) have been created as 
administrative agencies to assist the President in implementing laws enacted by the Congress 
(Warren 1998).  Executive agencies are therefore subject to many forms of presidential control 
(Garcia 1999): 
 
• Each department is headed by a Secretary, who is appointed by the President, confirmed 
by the Senate, and serves at the pleasure of the President.  Non-career appointees below 
the secretarial level are recruited and screened by the White House Office of Presidential 
Personnel, and many subcabinet positions require Senate confirmation. 
• By statute or Executive Order, each department’s budget request, staffing levels, 
Congressional communications, and data collection activities are subject to review or 
clearance by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the Executive Office of the 
President.  The Office of Personnel Management determines how many Senior Executive 
Service positions each agency will have. 
• The Department of Justice serves as the central litigating authority for executive 
departments. 
• The Office of Management and Budget reviews and clears newly developed regulations. 
 
For the most part, funding for personnel costs and other day-to-day operating expenses of the 
cabinet departments depends on annual appropriations by the Congress.  Other types of 
ions may be exempt from some or all of these types of presidential or  governmental organizat
ongressional control. C
 
Most federal health agencies are currently part of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS).  These include the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA), the Indian Health Service (IHS), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH).  Major 
health programs administered by other departments or independent agencies include military 
health care (in the Department of Defense), veterans health care (in the Department of Veterans 
Affairs), the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program (in the Office of Personnel 
Management), and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and 
hildren (WIC) (in the Department of Agriculture). C
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A number of commissions have been established outside the executive departments to make 
rules and orders to regulate specific activities or industries (Warren 1998).  These so-called 
independent regulatory commissions include the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Election 
Commission, Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, Federal Trade Commissi
National Labor Relations Board, National Transportation Safety Board, Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, Postal Rate Commissio
S
 
Several structural and procedural safeguards are designed to provide a substantial degree of 
independence for these commissions.  They typically consist of three to five members, who are 
appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate.  The members serve staggered five- to 
seven-year terms and cannot be removed except for cause.  No more than a simple major
commission may consist of members of the same political party.  Regulations issued by 
independent, multi-headed boards and commissions are not subject to OMB review and 
clearance (Garcia 1999).  However, commissions generally remain subject to budgetary contr
im
 
G
 
Government corporations are agencies that perform a business-like function and that are 
potentially self-sustaining through revenues generated by the sale of goods or services.  F
example, Amtrak is in the business of passenger rail transportation, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation charges for deposit insurance, the Tennessee Valley Authority sells 
power, and the U.S. Postal Service sells delivery services (Stanton 2002).  Other government 
corporations that are not part of cabinet departments include the Export-Import Bank, Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation, and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  These corporations 
are governed by boards of directors appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  An 
e
 
Some government corporations are part of executive departments and fall under the policy 
supervision and oversight of a cabinet secretary (Rivlin 1995).  For example, Federal Prison 
Industries is overseen by the Bureau of Prisons in the Department of Justice, and the Fed
H
 
Independent government corporations are generally included in the Budget of the U.S. 
Government, although they typically do not require annual appropriations, except when the 
government provides a subsidy.  To that extent, wholly owned government corporat
exempt from many of the legal limitations that apply to agencies funded by annual 
appropriations (Stanton 2002).  Ultimately, however, a government corporation will has much
as little independence as the Congress allows.  Citing a 1995 GAO study, Merlis reports that 
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Other Types of Independent Executive Agencies 
 
Several independent agencies—for example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Office of Personnel Management, National Science Foundation, Peace Corps, Small B
Administration, and Social Security Administration—do not fit neatly into any of the previous 
categories.  They are subject to most of the same laws and requirements as executive 
departments but, except for EPA, do not benefit from the prestige and Presidential access tha
attach to cabinet status.  (The administrat
o
models for new health-related agencies. 
 
The Social Security Administration (SSA) manages the Social Security retirement, survivors, 
and disability insurance program and the Supplemental Security Income program for low-income
aged and disabled persons and also performs many operational functions for Medicare.  It has a 
staff of about 59,000 and an administrative budget of some $9½ billion (OMB 2007).  SSA was 
made an independent agency by the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements 
Act of 1994.  “Proponents of SSA’s independence wanted to insulate it from everyday politi
fiscal, and operational policy decisions of the Government” (DeSimone 1995), but that hope was 
probably unrealistic and has not been fulfilled.  The 1994 act requires the Commissioner of 
Social Security to prepare an annual budget for SSA, which is to be submitted by the Preside
the Congress without revision along with the President’s budget.  This requirement is being 
satisfied only nominally through the inclusion of a paragraph in the budget’s Appendix, and 
appropriations for the agency’s administrative expenses have been tight.  As a practical matter, 
policymaking for Social Security remains directed from the White House. The Co
S
be tested when the Presidency changes hands from one political party to another. 
 
The Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board manages the Thrift Savings Plan, a defined-
contribution retirement savings program for participating employees of the federal government.  
The five members of the board are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of th
Senate and serve on a part-time basis.  The board appoints a full-time executive director, wh
responsible for day-to-day operation of the agency (Office of the Federal Register 2007).  The 
board and executive director serve as fiduciaries and manage the investments of the Thrift 
Savings Fund (now over $230 billion) on behalf of participants.   The board employs a staff of 
7
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Federal Reserve System 
 
From 1836, when the charter of the Second Bank of the United States expired, until 1913, when
President Wilson signed the law establishing the Federal Reserve System, the United States had 
12 
 
y 
e Federal Reserve’s unique structure reflects the historic circumstances of its 
irth—what one observer calls “the country’s abiding fear of concentrated financial power” 
 
are 
ur 
re appointed by the Board of 
overnors.  The directors appoint the Reserve Bank presidents (the chief executive officers) to 
n 
 
s.  
of 
and 
regulating the banking system and operating the payment system, including the distribution of 
ressional 
ppropriation or review by the Office of Management and Budget (Board of Governors 2007).  
 ($32 billion in 2007) is returned to the U.S. Treasury. 
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no central bank.  During this long interregnum the concept of central banking remained highl
controversial, and th
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(Lowenstein 2008). 
 
The Federal Reserve System comprises a Board of Governors and 12 regional Federal Reserve
Banks.  The seven members of the Board of Governors are appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate for 14-year terms.  The chairman and vice chairman of the board 
named by the President from among the members and confirmed by the Senate for a term of fo
years.  Each of the Federal Reserve Banks is supervised by a board of nine directors.  Six 
directors are elected by member banks in the district, and three a
G
five-year terms, subject to approval by the Board of Governors. 
 
As the U.S. central bank, the Federal Reserve is responsible for conducting the nation’s 
monetary policy in pursuit of stable prices and maximum employment.  It is considered to be a
independent central bank because its decisions do not need to be ratified by the President or 
anyone else in the executive branch.  The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) oversees 
open market operations, the principal tool of monetary policy.  The FOMC comprises the seven
members of the Board of Governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
and presidents of four other Reserve Banks, who serve as voting members on a rotating basi
One contemporary observer describes the FOMC as “an unwieldy and archaic body in the best 
times” (Lowenstein 2008).  The Federal Reserve also plays a major role in supervising 
cash and the clearance of checks and electronic payments (Board of Governors 2005). 
The income of the Federal Reserve System derives primarily from interest on the U.S. 
government securities that it acquires through open market operations.  The Federal Reserve also 
receives revenue from priced services, primarily check clearing.  The system’s income is 
available to pay its operating expenses (an estimated $3.3 billion in 2007) without Cong
a
The rest of the system’s income
 
Legislative Branch Agencies 
 
Several agencies, boards, and commissions—for example, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO, formerly the Government Accounting Office), the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), and the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission—are located in the legislative branch
of the federal government.  These organizations assist the Congress in undertaking its legislat
functions and serve the Congress in a staff role or an advisory capacity.  Any attempt to assign
e
command that Congress play no direct role in the execution of the laws” (Bowsher v. Synar). 
 
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, for example, is a 17-member commission 
advises the Congress on issues affecting the Medicare program, including payment rates, access
13 
 
y 
mployers, consumers, biomedical and health services researchers, and health economists, but 
ute a majority (see section 1805 of the Social Security Act). 
tal 
tions, and 
 to 
rprises (GSEs), which are government chartered and privately owned institutions 
reated by the Congress to help make credit more available to certain sectors of the economy 
are 
 from the budget of the organization within the 
onsoring agency that requests the work.  An FFRDC may receive up to 30 percent of its 
 
07).  
ed 
isciplines.  If an FFRDC were established to conduct comparative effectiveness analyses, it 
financial lapses by its then operator, the University of California (Broad 2005).  Nor do FFRDCs 
to care, quality of care, and the interaction of Medicare policies with health care deliver
generally.  Commissioners are appointed to three-year terms by the Comptroller General (who 
heads GAO) and serve part-time.  The members include health care providers, payers, 
e
providers may not constit
 
Public-Private Entities 
 
Sometimes the federal government carries out public purposes through non-governmental 
organizations.  Such entities are variously called public-private entities, quasi-governmen
organizations, or private instrumentalities of government.  Three types of public-private entities 
have been suggested as possible producers of information on comparative effectiveness: 
federally funded research and development centers, agency-related nonprofit organiza
Congressionally chartered nonprofit organizations.  These entities have some legal connection
the federal government and may receive most or all of their funding from the federal 
government, but they are not federal government agencies.  We do not consider government-
sponsored ente
c
(Kosar 2007). 
 
Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
 
Federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) are nonprofit, private 
organizations that federal agencies sponsor to meet technical or research needs.  FFRDCs 
managed by non-governmental organizations, including industrial firms, universities and 
colleges, and other nonprofit institutions, under the overall guidance and oversight of the 
sponsoring agency.  Federal funding comes
sp
funding from private sources (IOM 2007). 
 
Currently, nine departments or agencies sponsor 38 FFRDCs.  The Department of Energy 
sponsors 16, and the Department of Defense sponsors 10 (NSF 2007).  For example, the National
Cancer Institute at Frederick, operated by four firms for the National Institutes of Health, 
provides scientific and technical support services for programs of the National Cancer Institute.  
The Homeland Security Institute, administered by Analytic Services, Inc., evaluates systems and 
technologies and conducts risk analyses for the Department of Homeland Security (IOM 20
Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab), administered by a consortium of universities 
for the Department of Energy, conducts basic research in high-energy physics and relat
d
might be affiliated with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (IOM 2007). 
 
Establishment of an FFRDC does not absolve the sponsoring agency of responsibility if a 
problem arises.  In 2003, for example, the Department of Energy put the management of Los 
Alamos National Laboratory up for competitive bidding after a series of security, safety, and 
14 
 
 
on required Fermilab to lay 
ff staff and furlough the rest for two days a month (Chang 2007). 
gency-Related Nonprofit Organizations 
 
s 
f the 
 the foundation is off-budget, and its 
mployees are not federal employees (Kosar 2007). 
h 
lved 
 
 Drug Administration are ex officio members (as clarified by Public Law 
09-482, section 107). 
ongressionally Chartered Organizations 
mittees of jurisdiction have attempted to 
lace a moratorium on new charters (Kosar 2007).  
r 
ent 
also 
g from private sources, the bulk of their funding comes from the federal 
overnment. 
 
escape the uncertainties of the Congressional appropriation process.  Unanticipated reductions in
spending for high-energy physics in the fiscal year 2008 appropriati
o
 
A
 
The term “agency-related nonprofit organization” covers several disparate types (and an 
indeterminate number) of organizations that have a legal relationship with a department or 
agency of the federal government.  Sometimes agencies have found it useful to create such
organizations to accept and administer gifts of money and property.  The most prominent 
example is the National Park Foundation, established in 1967, which accepts and administer
gifts given to the National Park Service.  The Secretary of the Interior chairs the board and 
appoints its members.   The foundation is viewed as an adjunct activity of the Department o
Interior and is controlled by the department, although
e
 
Another such organization is the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health (FNIH).  The 
Congress established the foundation as a non-profit corporation in 1996 to support the researc
priorities of the National Institutes of Health by raising private sector funds to stimulate and 
facilitate the formation of public-private partnerships (FNIH 2007a).  The foundation is invo
in nearly 50 public-private partnerships and has raised approximately $350 million since its 
inception, including $200 million from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation for the Grand 
Challenges in Global Health initiative (FNIH 2007b).  Members of the foundation's board are
appointed under the bylaws of the Foundation, and the directors of the National Institutes of 
Health and the Food and
1
 
C
 
Congressionally chartered nonprofit organizations represent still another category of quasi-
governmental organizations.  Under subtitle II of title 36 of the U.S. Code, the Congress has 
chartered 92 “patriotic and national organizations.”  The federal chartering process is largely 
honorific, and in recent years the Congressional com
p
 
Congressionally chartered organizations do not receive direct federal appropriations (Kosa
2007).  The charters of the National Academy of Public Administration and the National 
Academy of Sciences, however, provide that the federal government may request the academies 
to prepare reports in their areas of expertise, and that the reports shall be paid by the governm
from appropriations for that purpose (36 U.S.C. 1501, 1503).  Although the academies 
receive fundin
g
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ISSUES IN CHOOSING AN APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
 
The choice of an appropriate organizational structure to carry out a particular public function 
raises several issues or questions.  These range from relatively mundane questions of funding 
sources and managerial flexibility to the highest one—should the organization be located in the 
public or private sector (Merlis 2000; Stanton 2002). 
 
Funding Authority  
 
The degree of control by the President and the Congress over a government agency’s funding—
and the predictability of that funding—may vary, but it is not fully determined by an agency’s 
organizational form.  Most federal executive agencies, as previously noted, are subject to the 
executive budget process and rely on annual Congressional appropriations to fund their 
personnel costs and other operating expenses.  Even when the administrative expenses are paid 
out of dedicated taxes or premiums (as for the Medicare program) or user fees (as with the 
review of drugs and medical devices by the Food and Drug Administration), annual 
appropriations action is usually required. 
 
A permanent appropriation—authority to spend money without annual Congressional action—
can provide a substantial degree of stability in funding for an executive branch agency.   For 
example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision, 
which regulate national banks and savings associations, respectively, are authorized to finance 
their administrative expenses through mandatory assessments on the institutions which they 
regulate (OMB 2007).  Despite this degree of financial independence, the two agencies remain 
responsible to the President (both are part of the Department of the Treasury) and the Congress 
(through their authorizing statute and periodic oversight). 
 
In contrast, entities that earn money from voluntary, business-type transactions with the public 
(such as the sale of power or postage) are subject more to market discipline than to the 
Congressional power of the purse, yet even in those cases political and regulatory oversight is 
never entirely lacking.  For example, the Postal Service (a government corporation) is regulated 
by the Postal Rate Commission (an independent regulatory commission), and the Congress 
continues to name post offices, subsidize certain types of mail, and set the terms under which the 
Postal Service operates.  No new agency can expect to obtain the financial independence of the 
Federal Reserve System, which can literally issue legal tender. 
 
Operational Flexibilities 
 
Government agencies are subject to various general laws affecting their operations, such as civil 
service and other personnel rules, contracting and other procurement requirements, and freedom 
of information or government-in-the-sunshine rules.  These requirements were originally adopted 
to assure organizational accountability, to prevent use of public positions and funds for political 
patronage or personal profit, and for other laudable purposes, but they are now sometimes seen 
as “barriers to efficient or responsive operations” (Merlis 2000). 
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In recent years, various steps have been taken to provide additional flexibilities for government 
agencies.  The Clinton Administration established a new organizational type, the performance-
based organization (PBO), which provides flexibilities in personnel, contracting, and other areas 
in exchange for a commitment to achieving performance goals.  Only two PBOs have been 
established—the Office of Federal Student Aid in the Department of Education and the Patent 
and Trademark Office in the Department of Commerce.  “The PBO concept,” writes Stanton, “is 
premised on the assumption that policy issues, which remain with the larger department, can be 
separated from operations, which are the province of the PBO” (Stanton 2002). 
 
Stanton observes, however, that the achievement of operational flexibilities does not necessarily 
require large-scale organizational redesign, and that targeted solutions are often available and 
usually preferable (Stanton 2002).  For example, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO), an agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development that 
regulates Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (both government-sponsored enterprises), is exempt from 
many standard civil service personnel rules including those for compensation.  This exemption 
allows OFHEO to compete for financial analysts and other skilled personnel.  (In 2008, the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency replaced OFHEO.)  Similarly, the National Institutes of Health 
and other agencies are provided special flexibilities for the hiring of physicians.  Upon its 
creation in 2002, the Department of Homeland Security was exempted from many civil service 
requirements (Lee 2005).  And in the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress 
authorized the Department of Defense to design and implement a new personnel system for its 
civilian employees (Ballenstedt 2008).  
Conversely, public-private organizations can also be made subject to some of the same 
procedural requirements as government agencies.  In 1997, for example, the Congress added 
certain requirements relating to the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of 
Public Administration to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App. §15). 
Political Independence and Accountability 
 
A public or public-private entity must steer a course between maintaining political accountability 
and avoiding undue political interference.  There is no clear line, however, that separates 
accountability from interference, and two different observers may not view a given situation in 
the same way. 
 
The typical agency is subject to Presidential direction, Congressional oversight, and other outside 
influences, and the results are sometimes open to question.  We have already recounted the story 
of the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, which was almost abolished when back 
surgeons attacked the agency’s finding that most back surgery was unnecessary (Lewis 1995).  
AHRQ, the successor to AHCPR, continues to conduct comparative-effectiveness reviews, 
although this is not the agency’s main mission (MedPAC 2007).  In a study of selective 
Medicare coverage determinations, Jost found that the proponents of new technologies—such as 
providers, manufacturers, and single-disease advocates—were the only external participants in 
the decision-making process (Jost 2005).  Pharmaceutical companies continually attempt to 
speed up the FDA’s approval of new drugs. 
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How the form and locus of an organization affects its accountability and independence is not at 
all clear.  If an agency is part of an executive department, the cabinet secretary can potentially 
assist the agency in the competition for resources and can defend the agency against outside 
pressures and narrow interests (Stanton 2002).  As the examples of the three HHS agencies in the 
previous paragraph show, however, this is not necessarily the result.  Nor does making an agency 
independent necessarily solve the problem—as the Social Security Administration illustrates.  
And even (or especially) an independent agency is subject to what is called “regulatory 
capture”—domination by representatives of the industry that it oversees. 
 
“The usual argument for removing a function from the political process ,” writes Merlis, “is that 
it is technical and better managed by experts.  However, if an entity is freed from politics, if it 
does not answer to the President, just whom does it answer to?  This is not just a question of 
accountability, but rather of the entity’s own sense of its constituency and hence of its mission.”  
In the case of a Medicare (or other health insurance) board, Merlis asks, who would be its 
constituency—beneficiaries, taxpayers, insurers, providers (Merlis 2000)? 
 
Some contend that giving an agency more political independence will facilitate decisions that 
have long-term benefits but impose short-term costs.  In the case of the Federal Reserve and 
other central banks, maintaining price stability or low inflation may require raising interest rates, 
which is likely to cause higher unemployment and lower plant utilization.  An agency that 
conducts comparative-effectiveness analysis may issue findings that could cause economic losses 
for some providers (such as back surgeons) or producers (such as manufacturers of drugs or 
medical devices).  An agency that makes coverage decisions will affect the livelihood of 
providers and manufacturers, the access of people to possibly life-saving treatments, and the cost 
of health insurance to those who pay the taxes or premiums.  Others would respond, however, 
that balancing such conflicting objectives is an inherently political responsibility that should not 
be assigned to an entity that is far removed from the normal political processes. 
 
Management Structure  
 
“As a general rule,” writes Stanton, “a single administrator rather than multi-member board best 
governs a federal agency.”  Among the limitations of the board structure are the following: 
 
• Members of a government board are likely to have divergent views on some major 
issues and little incentive to act in a collaborative fashion. 
• The board structure can impede accountability, since no one person if fully 
responsible for decisions. 
• Ex officio members of a board may be too busy to attend board meetings, and their 
alternates may not have the authority to act on their own. 
• Boards are less capable of timely decision-making. 
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onversely, Stanton notes, “there are some times when a board structure is appropriate or even 
necessa  f
 
• e.  
a 
ry, also provide some degree of 
of 
the 
 
ith 
sHealth (the state Medicaid agency), the Department of 
ion of Health Care Finance and Policy, the Division of Insurance, and the 
loyment Assistance. 
 
 
,” although not without controversy.  Some 
ilar 
C
ry or a government agency”: 
• For regulatory agencies (but not operating agencies), a divergence of viewpoints may 
help assure that a fair decision is reached. 
Multi-member boards also help insulate agencies from possible political interferenc
In the case of both the Postal Service and the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment 
Board, the insertion of a board between the chief executive of the agency and the 
political process helps “insulate the agency’s operations from the kind of untoward 
political intervention that characterized the Post Office Department” (Stanton 2002). 
 
An advisory board can provide some of the advantages of a governing board without all the 
disadvantages.  Federal agencies are advised by a vast number of boards and committees, whose 
operations are generally covered by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).  Advisory 
boards provide an opportunity to involve a wide variety of stakeholders and points of view in 
deliberative process.  Their recommendations, even if only adviso
political protection for an agency administrator.  However, an agency that does not accept an 
advisory board’s recommendation may invite political criticism. 
 
The Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, which administers many elements 
the health reforms in Massachusetts, is “an independent public entity” governed by a 10-member 
board.  The Connector is assigned considerable discretion in important areas, for example, in 
establishing affordability standards and defining minimum creditable coverage for purposes of 
the individual mandate.  Although described as independent, the Connector is closely tied to 
political process.  Four members of the board are state officials who serve ex officio, three are
appointed by the governor, and three are appointed by the attorney general (who, like the 
governor, is directly elected).  The appointed members are chosen from specified categories 
(actuaries, health economists, small business, consumer organizations, organized labor, and 
employee benefit specialists) and serve for three-year terms.  The chair of the board, who is the 
governor’s Secretary of Administration and Finance, selects the executive director of the 
Connector (Massachusetts 2007).  In carrying out its functions, the Connector works closely w
many other state agencies, including Mas
Revenue, the Divis
Division of Unemp
 
Public or Private 
 
The ultimate issue in designing an organization to carry out a public purpose is whether it should 
be governmental or private.  As a general principle, activities that are “inherently governmental”
must be performed by a government agency and government personnel (OMB 2003).  However,
the scope of “inherently governmental” activities is contested and changeable.  As part of its 
effort to put out more activities to private competition, the George W. Bush Administration has 
narrowed the definition of “inherently governmental
states and countries (notably, New Zealand) use private contractors to perform activities sim
to those carried out by U.S. government personnel. 
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Acco
 
ublic  
 
g 
exercise of sovereign government authority or the establishment of 
procedures and processes related to the oversight of monetary transactions or entitlements 
 pages to elaborate upon this basic definition and to 
istinguish “inherently governmental” from “commercial activities,” which may (but need not) 
s 
are 
ave 
e 
ugh a governmental entity, the Federal Reserve System, like other central 
anks, provides for no public input and no appeal by those affected by its decisions to raise or 
ver, non-profit private organizations differ from 
r-profit ones.  None of the health reform proposals discussed here, however, involves creating 
 to carry out a public purpose. 
 
rding to the current version of the Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-76: 
An inherently governmental activity is an activity that is so intimately related to the p
interest as to mandate performance by government personnel.  These activities require the
exercise of substantial discretion in applying government authority and/or in makin
decisions for the government.  Inherently governmental activities normally fall into two  
categories: the 
(OMB 2003). 
 
The circular takes an additional 1-½
d
be performed by the private sector. 
 
An important difference between governmental and private entities is the extent of procedural 
and due process rights they must accord to individuals or businesses affected by their decision
(Merlis 2000; Stanton 2002).  Medicare, for example, has formal appeal mechanisms both for 
health plans and for beneficiaries enrolled in both traditional Medicare and private Medic
Advantage plans.  In contrast, most enrollees in employer-sponsored health insurance plans h
“only a limited ability to contest plan benefit or coverage decisions” (Merlis 2000).  The 
appropriate scope of appeal rights for those affected by cost-effectiveness studies, coverage 
decisions, health insurance exchanges, or a new public health insurance plan would doubtless b
hotly debated.  Altho
b
lower interest rates. 
 
Stanton observes that governmental and private entities also perform differently because they 
have different incentives (Stanton 2002).  Moreo
fo
a for-profit entity
 
CONCLUSION
 
The Standing Panel on Executive Organization Management of the National Academy of Public 
Administration has identified several principles to guide the structure and organization of the
federal government.  One principle is that “organizational design should be tailored to reflect th
distinct requirements of different types of government programs so as to facilitate effective 
performance and maintain accountability.”  In elaboration, the panel observes, “One size does 
not fit all types of governmental programs. . . . The distinction between agencies responsible 
[for] formulating basic policies and those responsible for operations is especially importa
The panel expresses particular concern that mislabeling of governmental organizations as qu
or non-governmental entiti
 
e 
nt.”   
asi- 
es “raise[s] serious constitutional questions” when they “use 
overnment powers and funds without being fully accountable either to the President or the 
Congress” (NAPA 1997). 
g
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 and 
xperts on administrative law and health policy, Jerry L. Mashaw of Yale Law 
chool, observes: 
 
e (coverage, cost, payment rates, plan regulation, 
s one 
t 
ns 
ly and opaquely. Hence, the Fed's independence is acceptable—but only 
reluctantly. 
 it could 
” 
tem may be that it is simply too 
plausible to spend much time on (Mashaw 2007). 
 of 
solutions to many problems that confront government 
agencies and programs” (Stanton 2002).
 
This principle leads to the conclusion that a quasi-governmental organization might be suitable 
for producing advisory information on the comparative effectiveness of medical treatments
procedures but not for making coverage decisions or managing the marketplace for health 
insurance—activities that clearly involve policy formulation.  Proposals for a “Health Fed” to 
manage the health insurance marketplace also raise serious issues of accountability.  One of the 
nation’s foremost e
S
[A “Health Fed”] would quite clearly be the most powerful administrative agency ever 
created in the U.S.  [The proposal] imagines that all the politically fraught decisions that 
this agency would be called upon to mak
etc., etc.) could be taken out of politics. 
This seems to me to be “pie in the sky” thinking. There is a good reason that there i
and only one agency like the Fed—long painful experience in every industrialized 
country has demonstrated that you must have an independent central bank if you wan
any semblance of monetary stability. And the Fed does only one thing--regulate the 
money supply (sort of)—a thing that coerces no one and that affects ordinary America
only indirect
Maybe a similar case could be made for a health insurance czar, but I suspect that
be only if one were thinking about a limited technical function—like setting risk 
adjustment formulae. The reason that no one has fleshed out the idea of a “Health Fed
that would administer a national health insurance sys
im
 
In the end, as Stanton observes, “Many problems do not have solutions that involve 
organizational design.  Elements such as leadership, quality of personnel and systems, level
funding, and freedom from unwise legal and regulatory constraints may be as important as 
organizational structure in the search for 
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APPENDIX—DETAILED PROPOSALS 
 
 
Breaux-Thomas Proposal 
 
Medicare Board—Overview   
There is a critical need for an administrative body that would perform a number of functions to 
ensure that a premium support system in successful. This administrative body—probably in the 
form of a Medicare Board—would look like other federal boards, for example, the Federal 
Reserve Board or the Thrift Savings Plan Board. The Medicare Board would:  
1. Be established outside of the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) for the 
purpose of administering the Medicare program. 
2. Be an active purchaser of health care for beneficiaries, negotiating benefits and premiums 
with private plans wishing to participate in the Medicare market. 
3. Have full negotiating authority, similar to that of the board that administers the California 
Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS). The CalPERS board controls health 
insurance plans' access to the Medicare market in that state. Plans failing to meet the 
Board's criteria for price, quality, efficiency, and other factors would not be able to offer 
coverage to the Medicare population. 
4. Have the authority to make all determinations regarding covered benefits. The Board 
would provide clear explanations of exactly what plans, including HCFA, are being asked 
to bid during each contract period. Plans would have the opportunity to offer their own 
ideas of how benefits might be structured, such as cost-sharing differences in and out-of-
network, but the Board would have final authority.  
5. As part of its annual negotiations with plans, would ensure that benefits offered by plans 
would not lead to an unintended government contribution expansion. If plans wished to 
offer additional benefits the Board believed would lead to an expanded government 
contribution--"benefit creep"--they could do so under certain conditions. Those benefits 
might be offered as a separate "rider," fully funded by the beneficiaries and not included 
in any computation of the government contribution.  
6. Operate an annual open enrollment process similar to the one operated by the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). The process would offer beneficiaries a 
wide choice of plans and stimulate active competition among plans for the beneficiaries' 
business. Beneficiaries would have been exposed to this type of process through their 
Medicare+Choice open-enrollment experiences. 
7. HCFA would continue to offer the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) plan and compete for 
beneficiaries like all other plans. There would be an updated benefit package with 
combined deductibles. The FFS plan would be available in all markets. HCFA could use 
third party administrators in some areas or for some services. 
 
Board Responsibilities 
The Medicare Board would be established outside of HCFA, which would run the FFS program 
and deal with the Board as any private plan. The Board would have the same authority and 
responsibility regarding FFS as it has for private plans. The traditional Medicare fee-for-service 
(FFS) program would be one of the plans under premium support and be available nationwide to 
all beneficiaries.  
The Board's management processes would be similar to those used by the CalPERS Board with 
its health insurance program and by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) with FEHBP.  
The Board would be responsible for determining beneficiary eligibility. Coordinating and 
contracting with the Social Security Administration, currently done by HCFA, would fall to the 
Board.  
The Board would issue an annual request for proposals from health plans to furnish benefits to 
Medicare beneficiaries. The request would specify all the requirements a plan must meet to have 
its bid considered acceptable including core benefits, adequacy of access to care through the 
plan's provider network, financial solvency, quality assurance, and beneficiary appeals. The 
request would highlight any changes in requirements enacted by Congress and the President as 
well as any new requirements administratively adopted by the Board.1
The Board would review submitted bids to assure that all statutory requirements have been met. 
Benefit packages offered in the bids would be reviewed with an eye toward assuring that each 
package adequately meets core benefit requirements and is not designed to attract a non-
representative subpopulation of beneficiaries and thus lead to either favorable or adverse 
selection. The Board would also review benefit packages to prevent benefit creep resulting in 
increased costs to both beneficiaries and taxpayers. If benefits are not acceptable, the Board 
would negotiate with the plan a package that is acceptable or not permit the plan to solicit 
enrollees. The Board would assess the premiums each plan intends to charge to assure that 
premiums are neither too high nor too low for the benefit package agreed upon.  
After approving benefits packages and premium rates, the Board would inform beneficiaries of 
the plans available to them, including Medicare FFS, in preparation for the annual open 
enrollment period when beneficiaries can choose to change plans. The Board manages the open 
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enrollment and notifies plans of any beneficiary enrollment changes. Based on beneficiary 
selections and the statutory formula for establishing the beneficiary and government 
contributions toward the premium, the Board will compute a beneficiary premium for each plan.2 
The Board cannot change the statutory formula, but will merely apply it.  
The Board would be responsible for monitoring health plan performance throughout the year, 
arranging for quality monitoring through organizations like the current Peer Review 
Organizations (PROs). Quality indicators of plan performance based on enrollee rating results 
would be sent to every enrollee annually. Plans would be rated according to their performance 
regarding coverage, access to care, emergency care, choice of doctors, and other factors. 
Accreditations, such as the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) and the Joint 
Commission on the Accreditation of Health Organizations (JCAHO), would be encouraged and 
reported to enrollees.  
The Board would set up a mechanism to provide an outside-of-plan process for beneficiary 
grievances and denials of services appeals. Ombudsman services and other services to facilitate 
the relationship between beneficiaries and plans would be established.  
Members would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Terms would 
overlap and be long enough length so no one President would be able to appoint the majority of 
the Board, and a significant percentage of the Board would not turn over at the same time. 
Members would be chosen to reflect the interests of beneficiaries, working taxpayers and 
providers. "Providers" include health plans and health care providers--such as hospitals and 
physicians. The Board would have a staff of full time civil servants, as well as contracting 
authority for outside assistance, such as consulting actuaries. 
Characteristics of HCFA under Premium Support 
The FFS program would be subject to the Medicare Board. HCFA would have the same 
relationship with the Board as would private plans. For example, the FFS bid would be submitted 
to the Board and subject to the same requirements/review as private plans.  
The Congress and the President would retain authority over benefit modifications to the FFS 
program through an appropriate legislative approval/disapproval process. The process would be 
expeditious to enable FFS to make any necessary changes in time to compete for enrollees.  
The current FFS administrative structure should meet FFS' needs in a premium support system. 
Continued use of intermediaries and carriers to process claims, PROs to review quality and 
necessity of care, and other contractors for various functions would be appropriate. Additional 
flexibility to select and compensate contractors is desirable so better efficiency and effectiveness 
incentives could be realized. 
Source: National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare. 1999. “Medicare Board.” 
http://thomas.loc.gov/medicare/3fmedbrd.htm. 
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Committee for Economic Development 
 
To move from the current health-care system to sustainable, affordable, quality care for all, CED 
recommends the following . . . : 
 
• To create an appropriate administrative structure: modernize and adapt the FEHBP to 
make it the framework for a national system of health insurance exchanges. Put the 
FEHBP under the supervision of a new agency patterned on the Federal Reserve Board. 
Here we will refer to it as the “Health Fed.” 
• To ease market entry across the country, to make health care more competitive and less 
costly, and to eliminate conflicts between state and federal regulation of health insurance: 
modernize and simplify health insurance regulation by creating an alternative federal 
regulatory system that multi-state health plans can choose. Designate the Health Fed as 
the regulatory agency. 
• To provide reliable, objective and authoritative scientific information about the value and 
costs of clinical interventions: create a national institute for medical outcomes and 
technology assessment, or build it onto the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
Translational Medicine Program which determines the effectiveness of new technology 
and procedures in the delivery system. . . .  
 
The Health Fed would oversee a network of regional exchanges and direct their operation, and 
become the regulator of health insurance for insurers choosing the national regulatory option. . . . 
Like the Federal Reserve, the Health Fed Board would make judgments about complex issues 
such as the specific details of coverage contracts and acceptable business practices. Also like the 
Federal Reserve, the Health Fed would be fee-funded and thus not subject to annual 
appropriations. One potential funding source is a small percentage of all health insurance 
premiums; for example, in 2006, a one percent assessment on premiums would have yielded over 
$6 billion. 
 
The Health Fed would be semi-independent. Its governors would be appointed for fourteen-year 
terms. They would not be drawn as ex-officio, but rather would be the best candidates with 
knowledge of the complexities of health care, without personal conflicts of interest. They would 
be supported by an expert staff that could be drawn from the existing agencies of Congress and 
the executive, such as the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, the Agency for Health 
Research and Quality, and perhaps the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, as well as 
from state governments. The board and its staff could build on the work of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), which has been successful in moving to 
national financial standards. It could seek input broadly to establish the regulatory framework for 
those insurers who choose national accreditation. 
 
If a network of independent regional exchanges was chosen to manage the regional markets, the 
Board would establish their locations and responsibilities. Regional exchange presidents or 
chairs could be selected by the national Health Fed Governors, while the remaining officers 
could be elected from among the appropriate stakeholders. The Health Fed would establish 
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standards to be used by all regional exchanges. The standards would ensure that the exchanges 
operated fairly, transparently and uniformly, that the plans’ offerings were easily understood, and 
that the plans met financial, quality and service standards. Regional exchanges could have both 
regulatory and research staffs to understand and evaluate innovative programs.  Risk equalization 
methods would be set forth by the Health Fed, informed by the experience and insights of the 
regional exchanges. . . .  
 
This Health Fed is a fitting model for the agency that would modernize and simplify health-
insurance regulation, and also provide an alternative federal regulatory system. It is based on a 
trusted semi-independent governmental agency: the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The 
Federal Reserve model would convey impartiality, expertise, freedom from narrow political 
interests, stability, and a long-term perspective with a board of governors serving long terms. . . .  
 
The health-care system urgently needs a new entity, which might be called the Institute for 
Medical Outcomes and Technology Assessment (IMOTA), to assess the effectiveness, cost and 
overall value of health interventions and practices – including drugs, devices, diagnostic tests, 
and medical practices and procedures. IMOTA could make recommendations for how to 
integrate new drugs or devices into the delivery system to realize savings – that is, process 
redesign. For example, it might consider how a new product enables improved processes. 
 
IMOTA would need a stable budget, large enough for its complex mission, to provide thorough 
insulation from short-term political pressures. It must be rigorously protected from conflicts of 
interest, and accountable to the public. One potential model would be to make IMOTA, like the 
health-insurance exchange system, a part of the Health Fed. Like the Federal Reserve Board, 
IMOTA should be freestanding and semi-autonomous. Its board should resemble the Federal 
Reserve in selection of members, numbers and terms. The board should set priorities, approve 
research, oversee staff and operations, coordinate with outside health groups, and ensure 
integrity and independence. The director should brief Congress periodically. Like the funding of 
the Health Fed, funding for IMOTA should come from the health-care financing system without 
annual appropriations. 
 
IMOTA would provide analyses, evaluations and findings. It would not itself make decisions 
about coverage. Rather, such decisions would remain with the same agencies and private insurers 
now responsible for them. . . .  
 
The Health Fed should integrate data from the exchange system and other national agencies. 
Like the Federal Reserve, it should issue periodic “Beige Books” to describe available plans and 
their affordability, and the performance of the plans and providers. This would facilitate public 
discussion of the affordability of health plans, what services should be covered, and targets and 
strategy for performance, efficiency, and quality improvement with universal coverage. If health 
expenditures continue to grow unsustainably, the Health Fed should analyze the causes, and 
report to the Congress with recommendations. 
 
Source: Committee for Economic Development. 2007. Quality, Affordable Health Care for All: 
Moving Beyond the Employer-Based Health Insurance System. Washington.
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Emanuel-Fuchs Proposal 
 
 
Independent Oversight 
 
To reduce political interference and allow tough administrative choices to be made, a National 
Health Board and twelve regional health boards would be established, modeled on the Federal 
Reserve System. Members of the National Health Board and the chairs of each regional health 
board would be nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate for a long fixed term 
(say, ten years), which could be renewed only once. The terms of the National Health Board 
members would be staggered, with the term of only one member expiring in any given year. This 
board would appoint the members of the regional health boards to similarly staggered terms of 
the same length. 
 
The administrative budgets of the National Health Board and the regional health boards would be 
funded from the dedicated VAT, not by an annual appropriation by Congress. The National 
Health Board would have responsibility to 
 
• define and regularly adjust the standard health benefits to reflect changes in standards of 
care, advances in technology, and fiscal realities; 
• conduct research to determine the risk adjustments necessary for the premiums paid to 
health plans; 
• determine payment differences based on geography; 
• sponsor research on quality, outcomes, and performance of the health care system; 
• oversee and coordinate the regional health boards; and 
• report regularly to Congress and the American public on the health care system. 
 
Within their geographic regions, the twelve regional health boards would have responsibility to 
 
• oversee the insurance exchanges; 
• certify and oversee the participating health plans and insurance companies and ensure 
that they have sufficient financial reserves and medical resources to provide the health 
services offered in the standard benefits package; 
• manage the enrollment of individuals and families in health plans and insurance 
companies and assign to a health plan those who do not enroll on their own; 
• pay the health plans and insurance companies the risk-adjusted premiums on their 
enrollees’ behalf; and 
• collect, analyze, and disseminate information on the quality of health care delivered by 
the individual health plans and insurance companies. 
 
Cost and Quality Control Mechanisms 
 
An Institute for Technology and Outcomes Assessment would be created to judge the value of 
new drugs, medical devices, tests, and other interventions and to assess patient outcomes under 
the system. This Institute would be responsible for 
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• systematic review of research studies and other data on the effectiveness of different 
drugs, devices, new technologies, and other interventions; 
• comparison of the effectiveness and costs of drugs, devices, diagnostic tests, and other 
interventions; 
• commissioning of research studies to compare drugs, devices, diagnostic tests, and other 
interventions; 
• collecting data from health plans and insurance companies on patient outcomes and on 
the drugs, medical technologies, and interventions used; and 
• disseminating data on technology and outcomes assessments to health plans, physicians, 
patients, drug and technology manufacturers, and the general public, while respecting 
patient confidentiality. 
 
To ensure the independence and objectivity of the Institute’s work, funding would come from a 
fixed share (estimated at 0.5 percent) of the total revenues of the dedicated VAT. In addition, its 
operations would be overseen by an independent board appointed by the National Health Board. 
 
Source: Ezekiel J. Emanuel and Victor R. Fuchs. 2007. A Comprehensive Cure: Universal 
Health Vouchers.  Washington: Brookings Institution.   Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-
11. 
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Jost Proposal 
 
A federal commission should be created to determine which items and services insurers should 
cover.  In part this task would be technical–the entity would commission and review technology 
assessments to determine which items and services were sufficiently effective and cost-effective 
to justify coverage.  The commission would also engage in policy-making, however, determining 
which items and services might prove particularly amenable to being used for risk selection, and 
thus for unfair competition among insurers. The entity should, insofar as possible, be shielded 
from political pressure.  [See Timothy S. Jost (ed.), Health Care Coverage Determinations: An 
International Comparative Study (Open University Press 2005).]  Its members should be 
appointed by someone reasonably apolitical . . . and serve for long terms. This commission 
would review coverage of existing as well as new items and services, but it could not possibly 
review all possible candidates.  Its agenda should rather be driven by requests from insurers, 
concerned about the cost implications of covering questionable technologies, or from patients or 
providers seeking services not generally covered by insurers. 
The Commission should sort items and services into four categories.  The first of these would be 
those that must be covered by all insurers, such as vaccinations for common diseases or 
emergency treatment for trauma victims.  These would in all likelihood be relatively 
uncontroversial in most instances, and indeed the list could be quite short since most of these 
services will not come to the attention of the commission.  Second, there would be items and 
services that should not be covered by insurance policies subsidized by tax credits or other public 
funds because there is no credible evidence that they are effective or because they are even 
dangerous, like laetrile therapy for cancer.  Third, there would be items or services that insurers 
could cover or not cover at their option, like Lasik surgery for correcting refractive error.  
Finally, there should be a list of services that would be recommended for coverage but not 
required.  Insurers would not have to cover these services, but would have to prominently 
disclose in their marketing literature that these items or services were recommended by the 
federal commission, but were not covered by the particular policy.   This would allow insurers to 
compete on the basis of coverage and cost, but in an environment where consumers knew what 
they were giving up for the price they were paying. 
Source: Timothy Stoltzfus Jost. 2007. “Fresh Thinking—Legal and Regulatory Issues Presented 
by Health Care Reform.” Unpublished. 
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Medicare Payment Advisory Commission Proposal 
 
Recommendation: The Congress should charge an independent entity to sponsor credible 
research on comparative effectiveness of health care services and disseminate this information to 
patients, providers, and public and private payers. 
 
Congress should establish an independent entity whose sole mission is to produce and provide 
information about the comparative effectiveness of health care services. Since the information 
can benefit all users and is a public good, a federal role is necessary to produce the information 
and make it publicly available. 
 
Such an entity would: 
 
• be independent and have a secure and sufficient source of funding; 
• produce objective information and operate under a transparent process; 
• seek input on agenda items from patients, providers, and payers; 
• re-examine comparative effectiveness of interventions over time; 
• disseminate information to providers, patients, and public and private payers; and 
• have no role in making or recommending coverage or payment decisions for payers. 
 
There are different ways to carry out a federal role. The Commission prefers a public–private 
option, to reflect that all payers and patients will gain from comparative-effectiveness 
information. Funding could come from some public and some private sources or from all public 
sources. An independent board of experts should oversee the development of a research agenda 
and ensure that the research is objective and methodologically rigorous. 
 
The entity’s primary mission is to sponsor studies that compare the clinical effectiveness of a 
service with its alternatives. While cost effectiveness is not a primary mission, the Commission 
does not rule it out. In the simplest case, cost may be an important factor to consider for two 
services that are equally effective in a given population. But even when clinical effectiveness 
differs, it may be important for end users to be aware of costs. We emphasize that the entity 
would not have a role in how public and private payers apply this information—that is, coverage 
or payment decisions. Instead, it would produce and disseminate comparative-effectiveness 
information to purchasers, providers, and patients who would then decide how to use it. 
 
The Commission envisions that the entity would contract out most of the research to outside 
groups, including existing governmental agencies, with experience conducting comparative-
effectiveness studies. Thus, a federal role need not result in a large expansion of the government. 
To ensure that its research is credible, the entity would collaborate with other researchers to help 
establish high standards for the methods used to conduct comparative effectiveness studies. 
 
Widespread use of the information will depend on the credibility of the entity conducting the 
studies. Operating under a transparent process and providing a public forum for stakeholders to 
critique ongoing work will enhance the credibility of the research. Because comparative 
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effectiveness is a public good, the entity’s agenda should reflect priorities of public and private 
groups and encompass all patient groups. 
 
Disseminating the research findings to a wide audience will be an important function of the 
entity; it should not be treated as a minor activity to be undertaken after studies are completed. 
The entity should communicate its findings to reach audiences with different levels of 
sophistication. 
 
Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. 2007. Promoting Greater Efficiency in 
Medicare.  Washington. 
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New America Foundation Proposal 
 
 
A New Insurance Marketplace 
 
The bedrock of our proposal is an insurance market that preserves and improves upon the 
advantages of employer group purchasing and marketing, with its inbuilt administrative 
economies of scale and broad risk pooling. Ensuring that the new insurance marketplace is 
efficient, fair, and transparent can best be accomplished by establishing an Insurance Purchasing 
Exchange, designed to govern the health insurance marketplace. The exchange could be 
managed by a public entity, as is the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, which is run 
by the Office of Personnel Management. Or it could be managed by a nonprofit entity like the 
Pacific Business Group on Health, which administers coverage for large employers in California. 
It might also make sense initially to have multiple exchanges operating throughout the country. 
These exchanges could also be organized along state lines, or on a regional basis, with smaller 
states joining forces to form a single marketplace. Large states like California and New York 
might consider establishing several separate exchanges to serve their local health markets more 
efficiently. 
 
Benefits Board 
 
The Basic Plan and its mandated benefits package would be determined and modified 
periodically by a Benefits Board, whose members would be appointed by the U.S. comptroller 
general. This board would be charged with balancing the natural tension between expanding 
coverage of clinically valuable services and minimizing the increase in taxpayer-financed 
subsidies. It would also evaluate medical research to identify effective treatments and 
procedures. This knowledge would inform decisions about which services to cover as well as 
how to set cost-sharing with respect to services covered in the Basic Plan. This will enable cost-
sharing, or demand-side incentives, to be used to guide patients toward effective treatments and 
away from treatments that have not been proven effective. A similar approach, pioneered at the 
University of Michigan and used as an employee-benefit negotiation tool, has been successful in 
getting diverse citizens to see the need to balance benefit package limits with concerns about 
access to appropriate care.  The Benefits Board would also be responsible for developing the 
complementary cost-sharing subsidy package that low-income individuals will receive along 
with the Basic Plan at no cost or at reduced cost. . . .  
 
The Benefits Board would be an independent entity, but since Congress would fund the board, 
the Insurance Purchasing Exchange, and subsidies, it would be expected to work closely with 
Congress, more or less like the Federal Reserve chairman does. 
 
Comparative Effectiveness Agency 
 
To further the cause of efficiency, we should create a Comparative Effectiveness Agency (CEA), 
a public organization that would fund and direct a series of efficiency studies on new medical 
devices and surgical procedures. The research itself would be conducted by universities and 
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private research entities using rigorous scientific methods. The CEA would not have the power 
to force the Benefits Board to follow its recommendations, but it would have the power and 
capacity to disseminate its findings to the health care providers, health plans and to the media, so 
that with proper pay for performance incentives in place, the use of inferior products or 
techniques would become far more rare and persist for a shorter time than is the case today. The 
CEA could be constituted as quasi-public agency, because although it would need federal 
funding it could and should be governed by a combination of political appointees and the 
leadership of the major learned medical societies and of academic medicine. By this means, we 
would obtain a “buy in” from research leaders to improve the efficiency of health care delivery 
services. This is the best way to make a 21st-century health system continue to function well for 
all Americans. 
 
 
Source: Len M. Nichols. 2007. A Sustainable Health System for All Americans. Washington: 
New America Foundation. 
 
